



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

course. A similar treatment may be brought to bear upon the underlying ideas of biology. In like manner the status, significance, and limitations of psychology as a natural science should receive attention. This survey of the philosophy of nature is of great service to a considerable number of alert minds, and serves to bring philosophy home to men who otherwise would not be able to connect their scientific specialities with the abstract and general results of the metaphysician.

I have mentioned three cardinal aims of an introductory course in philosophy. Not even by implication does this exhaust the list. It is possible that there has been more poor pedagogies in this field, throughout the ages, than in any other branch in the university. Yet, even so, the course has exercised great influence, and as we progressively master the pedagogical problems involved I believe it can become one of the very most serviceable of university studies.

EDGAR L. HINMAN.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY THROUGH THE PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY

I SERIOUSLY propose that some one who knows much history and much philosophy spend the remainder of his life in making a book based on a historical study of the metaphysical and ethical interpretations of life implied in the popular institutions of the English people. I suggest that the book be entitled "A History of English Ideals."

Histories of philosophy, technically so-called, we have in great number and variety. But, in the total history of thinking, is all the philosophy worth noting contained within the few technical systems—the stock systems of our text-books? Do not historic events and institutions mean a vast realm of judgments on philosophical subjects, no less significant because expressed in the common language and the common deeds of common men? Grant that these judgments are loosely formulated and vaguely founded—that is, untechnical—are they for that reason utterly negligible, especially where they happen to be the verdicts of the social consciousness or the social conscience of a civilized people? Is there not a field yet unworked by philosophic historians and which genuinely belongs to a truly comprehensive history of philosophy?

It is a commendable fashion to tell those entering upon the study of metaphysics that, after all, metaphysics is not a thing apart from

the ordinary business of life, that even common-sense attitudes involve an unconscious theory of reality. But, supplementing this statement, little or no explicit reference is made concerning what particular attitudes of common-sense imply what particular metaphysics. There are, indeed, isolated instances of certain realists appealing to the verdicts of common-sense as to a sort of sanction. But nobody has attempted an empirical history of the popular judgments of any people concerning the true, the real, and the right, as expressed or implied in what one broadly calls social institutions. Yet nobody can deny the explicit and general use by any civilized society of the epistemological, ontological, and moral predicates; nor can any one deny that these predicates are decisively implied in certain classes of social deeds. Surely it is a rational question to ask what sort of institutions would be the expression of a given system of philosophy or ethics universally adopted; the converse of this question is equally rational. In other words, there is such a thing as a body of non-technical philosophy; and a history of non-technical philosophy is possible.

The realms of such social judgments as interest the philosopher are the realms of the more permanent and pervasive popular interests. For instance, one of these interests is government. The innumerable ways which people use to express their attitude towards their government are also innumerable ways of expressing moral approvals of ultimate significance as well as quite definable metaphysical convictions about the relatively real. Show me the form of government which a people tolerates at any particular period, enumerate the issues which to it are real, tell me its attitudes towards these issues and the most popular solutions of them, and I in turn will show you a fairly consistent ethical and metaphysical interpretation of life, of which all this is the logical expression. Now, if you will not confine yourself to the social institution of government alone, but will inform me of the prevalent judgments about religious, educational, and social problems, of the sort of books most read and of the popular reaction upon them, of the type of men acclaimed as great and chosen as leaders, in short, if you will give me an insight into all the important social institutions of the period, I shall be able to give to you what is the general attitude towards the problems of what it is to be true, to be real, and to be good. And, having the popular verdicts, it would be of supreme interest to compare them with the technical philosophies of the period and to show their identities, their divergencies, and their mutual influences. Often would one find that an age's social verdicts are surprisingly near the technical pronouncements of the metaphysicians and ethicists. Witness, the period of

the French enlightenment. Witness, technical pragmatism (if such there be) and the popular pragmatism of the American people. This sort of research is what I propose in suggesting a history of English ideals.

Thus far the function of such a work seems dangerously near that of a philosophy of history in the Hegelian sense. But even if it were, the work would be of great value: indeed, I hardly comprehend why a philosophy of English history in the general spirit of Hegel's conception is not written by some ardent Hegelian. We are not without attempts at a philosophy of the English *history of philosophy*, but I know of no philosophy of English *history* in the metaphysical sense.

But what I propose differs from an Hegelian philosophy of history in this: it would not attempt to reveal in history the realization of a dialectical process; and its interpretations would not depend upon the standpoint of a definite metaphysics held by the author. Thus, it would not be Hegelian at all. One can hold with Hegel that every important period of history expresses an idea without appealing to all history as the logical realization, after a set form, of the Idea, or trying to justify necessary stages conceived *a priori*. One can maintain that there is philosophy *in* history and yet have no philosophy of history whatsoever. A history of English ideals might incidentally uncover a significant logical sequence, but it need not be the result of the metaphysical prejudgment of the writer. I suggest that it be purely empirical in this respect. Even the concept of progress, so unconsciously common to historians themselves, could be ignored advantageously.

What would be the worth of such a work as an introduction for English-speaking students to philosophy? What is the merit of an introduction to philosophy through the philosophy in history? Few writers of introductions have articulated philosophy in any definite way with what the average student already knows. Now, were the question fairly put, I think it would be found that the average sophomore knows as much about history as any systematized body of knowledge, especially the history of his own country. I mean history to be understood in the broad sense of the history of a people, not merely of its politics. In the first place, history is a part of the student's curriculum from the grammar-school; and statistics show how generously it is elected in college. In the second place, history is intrinsically interesting to the average man. In the third place, it is indirectly communicated through countless channels, through novels, poetry, newspapers, and conversation. In a democracy, where politics is a perennial topic of conversation, and a quadrennial

topic of agitation, some knowledge of history is inevitable on the part of every social being who has any intellectual fiber at all.

Thus, an introduction to philosophy through the philosophy in history would be, first of all, psychologically adequate—that is, it would be an introduction by way of a natural and cultivated interest. In his “Introduction to Philosophy,” Külpe rightly names among his four reasons why a need of metaphysics is felt: “(1) Some measure of uncertainty in political and legal relations; (2) insecurity and discomfort in the affairs of social life” (p. 28). A history of English ideals would attempt to show how such unrests are implicit seekings which may, without any violence whatever, be defined in metaphysical and ethical terms, and how the results of the search are institutions also thus definable. Every philosopher recognizes that philosophy grows out of the demands of life: the best way to introduce philosophy to living men is to lead them to discover it as implied in life. It is owing to the psychological reasons here set forth that Sibree could say in his translator’s preface to Hegel’s “Philosophy of History” that Hegel’s lectures on this topic “are recognized in Germany as a popular introduction to his system; their form is less rigid than the generality of metaphysical treatises, and the illustrations, which occupy a large proportion of the work are drawn from a field of observation more familiar perhaps than any other to those who have not devoted much time to metaphysical studies” (p. iii). The same general thesis that I urge is also expressed by Gans in his preface to the first edition of Hegel’s work. He points out that the lectures “will excite the interest of youthful hearers, and associate what is to be presented to their attention with what they already know. And since of all the materials that can be subjected to philosophic treatment, history is always the one with whose subject persons of comparatively youthful years become earliest acquainted, the ‘Philosophy of History’ may also be expected to connect itself with what was previously known, and not teach the subject itself . . . but rather confine itself to exhibiting the workings of the Idea in a material to which the hearer is supposed to be no stranger” (p. xix).

But granting that such an introduction would possess some psychological adequacy, would it be *philosophically* adequate: would the reader be effectively introduced to that to which we wish to introduce him? Again, it is obvious that most introductions are not very explicit as to what they wish to introduce their readers, beyond assuming that it is to philosophy. Some appear to identify the philosophy to which the student needs introduction with a sort of philosophical dictionary; others with the problems of philosophy; others with the typical solutions of these problems; others with the

historic systems; others with the particular system which the introducer holds; others with the power of spontaneous philosophic thinking; others still, and by far the greater number, seek to introduce the student to the other more advanced courses in philosophy commonly offered by philosophic departments.

I am unwilling to reject any one of these aims as foreign to an introduction to philosophy—indeed, I insist upon them all and hold that any introduction is inadequate which does not serve them all in some measure. But there is one purpose among these purposes indispensable to the attainment of any one of the rest, namely, the purpose of developing the power of spontaneous philosophic thinking. So I pass over an attempt to show how admirably in “A History of English Ideals” all types of doctrine would emerge and address myself to this question, Would such an introduction tend to engender the sort of thinking which we term philosophical?

I am persuaded that the reason why it is so notably hard to induce students to do independent thinking is that the problems with which we confront them do not seem to them worth while. They do not arise out of concrete situations with which they are themselves involved or with which they are familiarly interested. In itself, the metaphysical problem of the one and the many, or the problem of teleological criteria in ethics is not likely to heighten the pulse of the average sophomore. But the conditions are changed when the problem is made to emerge from an absorbing concrete social conflict or a compelling national crisis, historic or contemporary. It is not an artificiality thus to relate philosophy, philosophy from of old was born of just such concrete situations. And once the student has become accustomed not merely to philosophize, but to find life as he knows it and cares for it the subject-matter of his philosophizing, he surely is effectively introduced to the *sine qua non* of philosophy: philosophy is indeed to him a life and all is grist for the philosophic mill. Not only history, but contemporary events assume a new meaning. The late William T. Harris, in the preface to his exposition of Hegel’s logic, bears testimony to the efficacy of this sort of an introduction to philosophizing. He says: “He [Mr. Brockmeyer] impressed us with the practicability of philosophy, inasmuch as he could flash into the questions of the day, or even into the questions of the moment, the highest insight of philosophy and solve their problems. Even the hunting of wild turkeys or squirrels was the occasion for the use of philosophy. Philosophy came to mean with us, therefore, the most practical of all species of knowledge. We used it to solve all problems connected with school teaching and school management. We studied the ‘dialectic’ of politics and

political parties and understood how measures and men might be combined in its light" (p. xiii).

I shall not stop to discuss the question, "Why was history ever written, anyway?" although I strongly suspect that it exists not for the sake of its facts, but for the sake of its ideas. Nor do I wish to insist that the way indicated is the only way by which to introduce students to philosophy. I do think it is a highly attractive way among a number of legitimate ways; that it is especially feasible for certain classes of students, and that it would be helpful as an auxiliary to any introduction course. My main desire is to emphasize by an illustration, which could well enough have been otherwise, certain conditions which any adequate introduction to philosophy should observe and which none adequately do observe,—principally the condition of connecting philosophy vitally with the student's average interest. Whether that interest be named as history, or literature, or football, or comic opera, or law is of course an important question of fact: but the paramount thing is to introduce him through his interests, whatever they are. This for two reasons: first, because a man's mind won't let you introduce him in any other way; and, second, because the very best service you can do for the good fortunes of metaphysics is to show that it is not an abstraction snatched from the upper air, but an abstraction from life; or, better still, an abstraction working in and through life and so no mere abstraction at all.

JAY WILLIAM HUDSON.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Studi Kantiani. FELICE TOCCO. Palermo: Remo Sandron. Pp. 271.

It is indeed a relief, after having heard so much about the obscurity of Kant, to find a competent judge declaring and showing that after all Kant's writings are not so difficult to understand as is commonly supposed. Professor Tocco recognizes that "the author of critical philosophy, like all reformers, seems often obscure, because he does not always use the same words to express the same idea, and creates new terms or gives to the common term new and strange meanings." But he thinks at the same time that "this perplexity of language does not hinder us from clearly grasping the doctrine, many points of which, being beyond dispute, give us a true criterion for judging the rest" (p. 51). In fact, most of the dissensions about the meaning of Kant's philosophy depend merely on the contrasting systems of his interpreters, who mistake their criticisms for internal contradictions of the Kantian thought, as it happens, for example, with Volkelt